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I. INTRODUCTION
In an address to the House of Commons, Winston Churchill once
said, “No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has
been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those
other forms that have been tried from time to time.”1 His words are just as
true today as they were in 1947. With negative television ads, smear
campaigns, and politically motivated lawsuits, the state of American
democracy may seam bleak. Regardless of these unfortunate practices, one
of democracy’s best attributes remains intact; it is a recursive system. Even
when democratic politics is at its most despicable levels, the people still
possess the power to change the system and remove the offending party
from office. This too is applicable to partisan gerrymandering.2 If the
practice is offensive to a majority of the voting population, new representatives will be elected, notwithstanding the egregious shapes that are created
by the gerrymandering process.3 Democracy’s recursive nature combined
with our systems of federalism and separation of powers – both at the state
and federal level – make gerrymandering for political purposes an intelligent practice only if it is used to a point that is tolerable by voters.
The Supreme Court has had a difficult time in deciding how to handle the issue of partisan gerrymandering, a legislative procedure practiced
since our nation’s founding. Oscillating in the past half century, they have
1

CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 265 No. 32 (Alison Jones ed., Chambers
1997).
2
Gerrymandering is a noun meaning “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area
into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair
advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.” Its etymology comes from the
combination of Governor Elbridge “Gerry” and “salamander” after an election district
created when Gerry was governor of Massachusetts. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 708-9
(8th ed. 2004).
3
The optimum shape for a district is a circle because it is the most compact of shapes.
To determine how much a district is gerrymandered, an equation must be calculated to
determine how much it deviates from a circle: The area of the district is divided by pi, and
then the square root of that quotient is found to determine what the radius of the district
would be if it was a circle. That radius is multiplied by 2 and pi to determine what this
hypothetical circle’s circumference would be. The district’s actual circumference is
divided by the hypothetical circumference to find its deviation. If this final quotient were
1, it would be perfect, and as it increases above 1, it suggests more gerrymandering. By
running a district through a Geographic Information System program, its area and circumference can be found, and then if the equation is performed, its gerrymandering quotient
can be determined. Two of the most gerrymandered districts are Florida’s 3rd District
represented by Representative Corrine Brown (D) with a quotient of 4.59 and Georgia’s
11th District represented by Representative Phil Gingrey (R) with a quotient of 5.34. See
infra Appendix pp. 1-2.
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ruled non-racial gerrymandering as both nonjusticiable and justiciable, but
never with an agreement to a standard of unconstitutionality.4 Lower courts
have struggled to apply the Court’s confusing decisions pragmatically and
have been forced to nearly always dismiss such cases,5 but debate continues
as to whether courts should be addressing this issue at all. Some argue that
the Constitution expressly leaves congressional districting to the state
legislatures and Congress, with absolutely no role for courts; while others
claim judicial review and other legal and political developments allow
courts to intervene in the redistricting process. 6
At issue is the Elections Clause of the Constitution.7 Either this
clause is a manifest declaration that redistricting is principled in federalism
and separation of powers, foreclosing judicial activity, or the clause and
subsequent constitutional amendments permit court action in the redistricting process. The first theory leaves congressional districting to the elected
branches of government as a nonjusticiable political question, while the
second has several theories for a judicial role, such as First Amendment
protections, Equal Protection rights, or Guarantee Clause requirements.8 It
is clear that racial gerrymandering is both an Equal Protection Clause and a
Fifteenth Amendment violation,9 but the constitutionality of districting
based on political party identification remains in limbo.10
When the Supreme Court decided The Texas Redistricting Cases, it
only added to the confusion.11 While three justices held that the issue of
justiciability was not to be revisited, two did not take a position on the issue
4

Compare Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (holding political gerrymandering
cases properly justiciable under the equal protection clause), with Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267 (2004) (holding by plurality that political gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable).
5
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 280 nn.5-6 & 8.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
The Elections Clause reads, “The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing [sic] Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
8
Guarantee Clause challenges to redistricting plans have consistently been held nonjusticiable political questions; therefore this Note will not offer this argument for dispute.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see also Luther v. Borden 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)
(refusing to hear case where legitimacy of the Rhode Island government was challenged
under the Guarantee Clause). See generally U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4.
9
See Reynolds v. Sims, 379 U.S. 870 (1964); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980).
10
While this Note contends that all districting schemes are nonjusticiable political
questions, the focus of the discussion will be on congressional districting schemes because
the Elections Clause in the Constitution specifically governs these.
11
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (The Texas Redistricting Cases),
126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
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because they claimed it had not been argued, two stated explicitly that it
was justiciable, and two held that it was not.12 This was a missed opportunity to resolve an important question in American politics and law, and the
Court should have held that non-racial gerrymandering is a “political
question.”13 While the holding was correct, the plurality opinion with its
multiple concurrences and dissents produce no clear guidance for future
cases; strictly applying a standard that political gerrymandering cases are
nonjusticiable is a better standard.
Part II will provide the background on the practice of political gerrymandering. It will explain its history and development, state arguments
for and against it, and suggest what role is proper for courts in this area.
Part III describes the Elections Clause; including its formation during the
Constitutional Convention, its implementation by the state legislatures and
Congress, and its interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court. After analyzing
the relationship between the Elections Clause and the practice of gerrymandering by state legislatures (and regulation thereof by Congress) throughout
American political history, a clearer baseline for proper judicial involvement should become more evident. Part IV will explain an exception to the
Election Clause’s default position that requires court action in gerrymandering, i.e. racial motivations in districting. Part V demonstrates that although
the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments require court supervision of
racial gerrymandering, this is not comparable to purely political gerrymandering. The Court ignored its prior rulings on this issue when it began
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, ignoring the default position
of the Elections Clause. A lack of any proper judicial role is further shown
by the Court’s inability to adequately articulate a manageable standard to
adjudicate the perceived problem, which is required to exclude such issues
from being qualified as a political question.14 Part VI is an analysis of The
Texas Redistricting Cases, in which the Court provided no further guidance
to state legislatures, Congress, or lower courts on how to handle the issue of
political gerrymandering. The flaws of its reasoning will be demonstrated
along with examples of why judicial involvement is unnecessary. Part VII
forecasts the effects of The Texas Redistricting Cases on state legislatures,
and suggests ways those bodies, Congress, and lower courts can mitigate
the holding of the case.
12

Id.
Something is a political question, and therefore nonjusticiable, if it meets any of the
following descriptions: the Constitution’s text commits the issue to another governmental
branch, a judicially discernable standard does not exist, a nonjudicial policy determination
must be made, a decision would be disrespectful to another branch, finality is needed to an
already made political decision, embarrassment could result from conflicting pronouncements. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
14
Id.
13
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II. POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING
A. Historical Perspective of Political Gerrymandering
The practice of politicians creating their own legislative districts and
attempting to influence the outcomes of elections with their designs has a
long history in American politics.15 Brought as a practice from England,
colonial politicians were familiar with the importance of shaping districts
for electoral advantage, i.e. gerrymandering. The phrase gerrymander was
first coined in 1812, but the development of the practice in America began
well over 100 years before.16 The first known appearance of gerrymandered
districts was in Pennsylvania during the formation of its colonial assembly
districts in 1705. The city of Philadelphia was artificially excluded from
Philadelphia County to weaken the former’s political influence, thus
creating the most prominent of colonial gerrymanders.17
After the Revolution, gerrymandering continued. One famous reported case (albeit disputed) is that of the attempt by Patrick Henry and his
fellow Anti-Federalist’s “unceasing efforts” to insure James Madison was
defeated in his election to the First Congress in 1788.18 Madison prevailed
in his congressional election, but by then the Founders were well versed in
gerrymandering, and “Washington, Madison, and Jefferson were not
unacquainted with the possible results of a partisan districting law.”19
Partisanship reached a climax by 1812, the year the term “gerrymander”
came into existence,20 and by that year, there had been twelve cases of
attempted or successful gerrymandered districting plans, nine of which
involved congressional districts.21
The “Era of Good Feeling” followed the War of 1812, and partisanship was less intense, and gerrymandering became less frequent.22 But, as
cycles in American politics occur, after several decades the practice resumed. As one scholar puts it, “By 1840 the gerrymander was a recognized
force in party politics and was generally attempted in all legislation enacted
for the formulation of election districts. It was generally conceded that each
15

ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER (Chicago:
Scott, Foresman and Company 1907).
16
Id. at 26-28.
17
Id. at 120.
18
2 WILLIAM C. RIVES, HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON 653-56
(Books for Libraries Press 1970) (1868).
19
GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 122.
20
Id. at 122, 16-17.
21
Id. at 121, 5-6.
22
Id. at 123.
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party would attempt to gain power which was not proportionate to its
numerical strength.”23 The first attempt to have an apportionment plan
declared unconstitutional was unsuccessful, as the issue was held nonjusticiable.24 Not until a later interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Baker v. Carr were any arguments successful that redistricting was not a
political question and thus justiciable.25
Technology may make gerrymandering more exact, and today’s
climate of intense partisanship may make gerrymandering more intense, but
the practice is as old as our country. There are times it occurs less frequently or abashedly, but gerrymandering is characteristic of American
politics. In fact the Supreme Court has stated, “Politics and political
considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.”26
B. Arguments For and Against Political Gerrymandering
Passionate arguments are raised by pundits and scholars alike to the
appropriateness of judicial action to curb partisan gerrymandering. Critics
of political gerrymandering claim that the practice undermines and weakens
our democracy or republican form of government, so therefore it is necessary for courts to intervene in the redistricting process.27 They contend that
partisan gerrymandering can crystallize the democratic process to such an
extreme that elections become moot.28 While those who disagree with the
justiciability of the issue argue that courts are ill equipped to handle the
political complexities of these cases.29 To them, it is always more appropriate for the “elected branches” to have the sole authority in redistricting.30
C. The Proper Role of Courts in Congressional Redistricting
Regardless of the inherent evils of purely partisan-motivated gerrymandering and the arguments for judicial intervention, the Constitution
clearly states that the default position for authority on congressional redistricting is the Elections Clause. It is textually demonstrative that state
23

Id.
Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
25
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26
Gaffney v. Cummings. 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (opinion by White, J.).
27
E.g., Jamal Greene, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under The Elections Clause,
114 YALE L.J. 1021 (2005);
28
E.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 Tex. L. REV. 1643 (1993).
29
E.g., Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002).
30
E.g., Editorial, DeLay’s Revenge, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2006, at A14.
24
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legislatures and Congress have jurisdiction over this process. Unless the
Constitution has been amended in this aspect, courts have no role in this
political process, and the test annunciated in Baker v. Carr – if applied
properly – only reinforces this conclusion. The Framers of the Constitution
were clear that the entity with the ultimate say of how candidates were
elected to Congress was Congress, not the legislatures, nor the president or
governors, and certainly not the courts.
Beyond the Constitution’s textually demonstrable indication that
Congress is to govern congressional districting, the Court has been unable
to articulate a standard by which partisan districting can be found unconstitutional, and judicial involvement is nevertheless unnecessary. Politics in
America is cyclical, and electoral paradigms shift and evolve to influence
the effects of congressional districting.31 Furthermore, after three attempts
at resolving the issue, the disagreement between the Supreme Court justices
has prevented any clarity and caused nothing but confusion.32 Because of
the Constitution’s textual direction, the lack of any agreeable legal standard,
and judicial involvement being unneeded, the proper role for courts in
partisan gerrymandering is abstention.
III. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE: PROVIDING FEDERAL ELECTION LAW’S
DEFAULT
During colonization, it was settled law in England that Parliament
was the ultimate and sole authority in determining the methods in which its
members were elected. Blackstone summarized this fact succinctly when
he said, “ It will be sufficient to observe, that the whole law of and custom
of parliament has its original from this one maxim, that whatever matter
arises concerning either house of parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that house to which it relates, and not elsewhere.”33
This concept would become the model for how Congress would be regulated under the U.S. Constitution.
31

Since the Depression, there have been two instances where redistricting took a “full
circle” in the states, eleven instances where redistricting took a “half circle” in the states,
and sixteen instances where redistricting produced “conflicted results” in the states. This is
measured only at reapportionment and the succeeding congressional election for states with
more than one representative. See infra Appendix p.3.
32
“Justice Kennedy’s discussion of appellants’ political-gerrymandering claims ably
demonstrates that, yet again, no party or judge has put forth a judicially discernable
standard by which to evaluate them (citation omitted)…. Instead, we again dispose of this
claim in a way that provides no guidance to lower-court judges and perpetuates a cause of
action with no discernable content.” The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. 2594, at
2663 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *163 (internal quotation omitted).
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A. The Framers’ Intent
The United States’ first attempt at government formation came in
1781’s Articles of Confederation. In the spirit of the Articles as a whole,
the process of choosing members of Congress was left entirely up to state
legislatures, which was archetypical of the Articles’ failure to provide an
adequate system of federal governance. In nearly all aspects of the confederation of the former colonies, including choosing members for the national
legislature, states essentially retained their “sovereignty, freedom and
independence” and no action could be taken unless nine states assented.34
Because of the underlying premise of state sovereignty guaranteed
in the Articles, state legislatures were free to select any method of appointing delegates to the Congress and were able to recall them or replace them
at any time.35 The only restrictions placed on the selection of delegates was
a basic set of term limits and a prohibition of a member from receiving
compensation from the national government.36 Article V made it explicit
that the states were solely responsible for maintaining their delegates.37
By 1787, it was clear that the Articles of Confederation was a failure
and a new agreement between the states was necessary. Many issues were
debated during the Constitutional Convention that summer in Philadelphia,
and the method of choosing members of Congress was one of them. The
Committee of Details’ first draft of the Constitution mentioned what would
become the Elections Clause, but without any mention of who would have
the ultimate authority over the electoral process.38 Many minor alterations
would occur, with the committee eventually recommending that the time,
place, and manner of elections to each house would be controlled by state
legislatures, but Congress could alter those.39
On August 9, the full convention took up the article for debate and
possible amending, which produced what is essentially Article I § 4 of the
U.S. Constitution. An attempt was made to make the article applicable only
to the House of Representatives, but this failed by a ten to one vote, and the
word “respectively” was added after “State,”40 but the Committee of Style
would later change “respectively” to “thereof.”41 The most contentious
34

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II; id. art. IX, cl. 6.
Id. art. V, cl. 1.
36
Id. art. V, cl. 2.
37
Id. art. V, cl. 3.
38
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 135 (Max Farrand ed.,
Yale University Press 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND’S].
39
2 id. at 155.
40
2 id. at 229.
41
2 id. at 592.
35
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debate was over an amendment offered by John Rutledge and Charles
Pinckney to strike “be altered by Congress” so as to make the state legislatures and not Congress the ultimate authority – essentially a debate over
federalism.42 The two South Carolinians were content with the freedom of
selection mandated by the Articles of Confederation, but that document’s
failures were the impetus for a stronger national government.
Proponents of Congress being the definitive authority over federal
election law made several arguments for the rejection of the RutledgePinckney amendment. Mr. Ghorum of Massachusetts argued that the
amendment would be akin to giving the counties of England authority in the
selection of members of Parliament. James Madison made it clear that not
giving Congress the ability to control the selection process could lead to
abuses by state legislatures, depriving “the people” with proper representation in the national government. While Mr. Morris of Pennsylvania, having
more faith in the state governments, suggested elections could be unintentionally certified incorrectly, with no remedy available to the Congress.43
The Rutledge-Pinckney amendment was rejected, and afterwards the
delegates gave Congress additionally authority by allowing it to not only
alter, but also make regulations if state legislatures should refuse or fail to
do so completely.44 An exception was added to the clause providing that
the place of choosing Senators remained under the sole authority of the
legislatures. The section was then agreed to, and the convention adjourned
for the day at 11:00 that morning.45 It is clear from the day’s discussions
that the Framers wanted Congress to have ultimate authority in deciding its
membership selection process. Although the principle was grounded in
federalism, the concept of judicial activity in the process – a separation of
powers concept – would have been even more foreign to the Framers and
rejected as the Rutledge-Pinckney amendment was.46
B. Congressional Acts
Congress has taken little action in response to its ability to amend or
42

2 id. at 240.
2 id. at 240-42. The English laws requiring Parliament to control its own elections
supports Mr. Ghorum’s analogy. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *177 (“[The
method of elections] is also regulated by the law of parliament….”).
44
2 FARRAND’S, supra note 36 at 242.
45
2 id. at 613; 2 id. at 229.
46
As the ratification of the Constitution was being debated in the state legislatures, the
federalism argument made by Rutledge and Pinckney continued, but the Founders were
confident and insistent that the Elections Clause was correct in providing Congress as the
ultimate authority in this area of the law. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 59, 60, 61 (Alexander
Hamilton).
43
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supersede state legislative redistricting policies, suggesting a faith in the
propriety of state legislative action. The first federal legislation enacted
under this authority was passed in 1842 and simply required representatives
to be elected in districts.47 Although this requirement was deleted from the
1850 Apportionment Act (allowing at-large elections), it was included in
the 1862 statute. 48 Additional requirements for congressional districts contiguity, compactness, and substantial population equality - were added to
later apportionment acts, but all the requirements for congressional districts
were absent from the law passed in 1929. Only in 1967 was the singlemember district requirement restored by Congress, which is the current 2
U.S.C. § 2c.49
Congressional restraint from directing state legislatures on the process of choosing members for the House of Representatives demonstrates
their belief that the fomer bodies are fully capable of establishing a fair and
democratic procedure. Only eight acts of Congress have established or
amended the requirements for procedures, and one of those permitted three
requirements - contiguity, compactness, and substantial population equality
- to expire.50 It appears that Congress’s only mandate for congressional
districts is that they exist, forbidding states from electing their representatives at-large.51 Besides the one requirement, state legislatures are freed by
Congress to conceive of the other details in which redistricting takes place.
Since the Elections Clause is a default provision, if Congress does not act
under the clause, state law is supreme.52
State legislatures immediately utilized their initial authority to regulate the selection of congressional members, and many did so by
implementing congressional districts within their states.53 It is obvious that
legislatures believed they possessed such power because of the Elections
Clause, and the only other authority that allowed such actions was the
tradition of districting for their own legislative bodies. It is evident that the
Elections Clause provides such authority as its wording provides legisla47

Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491 (repealed 1850).
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 117-21 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., U.S. Government Printing
Office 1996) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS]; see also 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 2-3 (2000).
49
2 U.S.C.A. § 2c (2000).
50
See Wood v. Broom, 387 U.S. 1 (1932).
51
Act of December 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §
2c (2000)).
52
Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997).
53
KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES 1789-1989 at
70 (Macmillan Publishing Company 1989) (showing at the 1st Congress there were 11
states that had more than one representative, and seven of those elected their members in
districts. Only Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania had at-large
elections for multiple members).
48
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tures access to all facets of electing members to the U.S. House of Representatives.54
C. Judicial Gloss
The Supreme Court has provided few cases to determine its jurisprudence of the Elections Clause. Even fewer are applicable to the question
of the justiciability of political gerrymandering cases, as it took the Court
until 1879 to determine that Congress’s regulations did indeed supersede
state legislative actions when they were inconsistent - as the Framers
intended.55 The Court later explained that Congress could restrict state
power by exercising its authority under the Elections Clause, although it has
infrequently done so.56 In essence, Congress can supplement state regulations or substitute its own, and has “supervisory power over the whole
subject.”57
The Court’s first detailed examination of Elections Clause parameters was a challenge to an Illinois apportionment plan that lacked substantial
equality of population amongst its districts.58 It was clearly recognized that
redistricting is embroiled in politics, and it would be improper for the
judiciary to compel the legislative bodies to act in regards to these processes
either through injunction or mandamus.59 Although the appellants raised
legitimate concerns of public harms, the Court made clear that by direction
of the Constitution, such issues had to be remedied elsewhere.60
Furthermore, the judiciary has consistently held that Congress is supreme to state legislatures under the Elections Clause, and state
governments cannot overstep congressional or constitutional mandates.
Twice in the past two decades the Court has held state legislative actions
unconstitutional regardless of claimed Elections Clause authority premised
54

The words “Times, Places, and Manner” answer the questions of “when,” “where,”
and “how.” All that is left to be answered is “who,” “what,” and “why.” “What” is
obviously voting, “why” is unanswerable, and “who” is covered by other sections of the
Constitution. The Framers choice of words in the Elections Clause suggests they intended
it to cover most aspects electoral regulation. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
55
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383-86 (1879). Contra H.R REP. NO. 28-60 (1st
Sess. 1843) (recommending legislation be passed stating section 2 of the 1842 Apportionment Act requiring single-member districts is unconstitutional since several states had
previously passed laws creating at-large elections for their members to the U.S. House of
Representatives).
56
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1940); see also supra Part III.B.
57
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367 (1932) (quoting Siebold, 100 U.S. at 387) (emphasis added).
58
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1945).
59
Id. at 544-55.
60
Id.
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on a lack of congressional actions. In Cook v. Gralike, the Court held that
state legislatures do not have the power under the Elections Clause to
require certain designations be placed beside the names of candidates.
Actions such are these are violations of the Qualifications Clause and the
First Amendment.61 These cases did not involve the issue of justiciability
of partisan gerrymandering cases, but held that state action can be held to
constitutional scrutiny even if the state claims its authority is derived from
the clause. States cannot cloak themselves from judicial intervention by
describing an action as a regulation of “Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.”62 If a legislative
action is truly such a regulation, such as redistricting, it is a wholly separate
matter.
Clearly, the pre-Civil War Elections Clause jurisprudence formulated congressional supremacy as to the regulation of the procedures in
which U.S. representatives were chosen. At that time, state legislatures had
default authority, Congress had overriding or supplemental authority, and
judicial action was totally foreclosed. The process of redistricting was
governed solely by the two former institutions.
IV. THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS: PROVIDING EXCEPTIONS TO THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE
At the end of the Civil War, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were added to the Constitution to help remedy the
blight of slavery from American democracy. These would provide the
Supreme Court with the ability to interject itself into some aspects of the
politics of redistricting, as was previously disallowed. Although judicial
foreclosure in redistricting remains the constitutional default position, the
entrenched inequities of racial discrimination provided exceptions.
A. The Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court took nearly 100 years before it entered the gerrymandering foray; first establishing the premise of one-person, one-vote to
counter the practice of state legislatures diluting the voting power of minorities. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted
this necessary action, without which the default position of the Elections
61

531 U.S. 510 (2001); see also U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)
(holding that a state law forbidding its members of the U.S. House of Representatives to
serve more than a certain number of terms was a violation of U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 2,
known as the “Qualifications Clause”).
62
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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Clause would have disallowed it.
In Baker v. Carr, the Court first announced that it had accepted the
constitutional invitation to decide the propriety of districting schemes,
previously holding that malapportionment challenges were a nonjusticiable
political question.63 The one-person, one-vote doctrine soon emerged from
which the Court explained that,
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated,
all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote – whatever their race,
whatever their sex, wherever their occupation, whatever their income, and whatever
their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.64

The requirement was extended to both houses of state legislatures in
Reynolds v. Sims, which held that the Alabama state senate’s apportionment
was an Equal Protection violation in those districts.65 The analogy to the
U.S. Senate was inadequate to allow unequal populations in any districts.
More importantly, Chief Justice Warren demonstrated that the need for
judicial action to implement equal population in districts was a result of
vote dilution of minority voters and the lack of any other available remedy.66 This injustice affected a protected class, i.e. race, and judicial action
through strict scrutiny was the only means to end it.67
Congressional districts were placed under the one-person, one-vote
requirement in Wesberry v. Sanders; marking the first time the judiciary
directly inserted itself into what was previously a Congress/state legislature
controlled field because of the Elections Clause.68 Relying more on Article
I § 2 of the Constitution as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court explained that the House of Representative’s creation was premised
on equal voting strength. But, the Equal Protection Clause was the impetus
for applying the principle to elections for the United States House of
63
64

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (applying the doctrine to the Georgia Assem-

bly).

65

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 568 (“The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal
state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as all races”); id. at 58687 ([T]he action taken by the District Court in this case… was an appropriate and wellconsidered exercise of judicial power”).
67
Partisan gerrymandering, as compared to racial gerrymandering, is also a historical
practice, but other remedies exist to correct it; such as participating in primaries, working
on campaigns, lobbying legislatures, and gubernatorial vetoes. Furthermore, party
identification has never been held as a protected class and is a characteristic that changes
amongst individuals.
68
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
66
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Representatives, even if it was not the Wesberry Court’s foundation.69
There is no doubt that the clause could have been used to decide the case
accordingly, but Article I § 2 provided a more “originalist” argument.70
These reapportionment decisions were controversial in the 1960s,
but they have become an established part of American democracy.71 The
judiciary acted to create a more representative democracy and prevented
further acts of racial discrimination in the political process. Racial minorities would have been unable to fully participate in elections without this
action, which was permitted by the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
with its Equal Protection Clause. Elected official were unlikely to correct
the mistakes of malapportionment practices themselves, as it would have
decreased their chances for reelection, creating a crystallization that is
dissimilar to the effects of political gerrymandering.72
B. The Fifteenth Amendment
In addition to the requirement that districts be equal in population,
Congress and the Supreme Court have used the Fifteenth Amendment’s
mandate that voting rights cannot be abridged “on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude” to scrutinize districting plans and prevent
racial gerrymandering.73 Gerrymandering is typically accomplished by
“cracking,” “packing,” and “stacking” voting populations to reduce a
segment of the population’s overall electoral success.74 This process has
69

Id. at 18-19 (“[Justice] Harlan has clearly demonstrated that both the historical
background and language preclude a finding that Art. 1, § 2, lays down the ipse dixit ‘one
person, one vote’ in congressional elections….I would examine the Georgia congressional
districts against the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”) (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70
Since this section of the Constitution was passed at the same time as the Elections
Clause, it is arguable that it can inherently restrict it by requiring equal population in
congressional districts. Cf. Mahan v. Powell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (holding that a dichotomy exists between legislative districting and congressional districting, as the former has
more latitude for population differences as compared to the latter, which is premised on
U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 2).
71
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 833 (Aspen Law & Business 2001).
72
See supra note 31.
73
The Fifteenth Amendment reads “The right of citizens of he United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
74
Cracking is separating and dispersing a concentrated group up into several districts
to deny that group a majority in any of the districts. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 395 (8th
ed. 2004). Packing is concentrating a minority group into a minimum number of districts
as a supermajority in those districts to limit their overall electoral influence. Id. at 1140.
Stacking is combining a large group into a district with a larger opposition group. Id. at
1440.
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consistently been used for partisan purposes, but the Fifteenth Amendment
prevents such techniques with racial motivations.
Since the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has
been the predominant force in enforcing its provisions, and the Supreme
Court has not used it to invalidate a legislative apportionment plan.75 It was
during Reconstruction when Congress began enacting legislation under the
amendment in order to bring former slaves into American politics as full
participants. Several acts were passed during this era to make interference
in elections a federal offense,76 but the Supreme Court limited these provisions to federal elections.77 The laws relating to election protections under
the Fifteenth Amendment were eventually repealed once Reconstruction
ended, leaving no enforcement provisions in place.78
In the 20th Century, both Congress and the Court have reestablished
principles to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment and its mandate against
racial gerrymandering. Laws were passed in 1957, 1960, 1964, 1965, 1968,
1970, 1975, 1980, and 1982 to prevent discrimination on account of race in
all aspects of voting, including districting plans.79 In Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, the Supreme Court held that legislative redistricting plans could
be a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment regardless of congressional
actions.80 Coming just prior to the formation of the one-person, one-vote
principle, the Court realized judicial action was not only permissible, but
also required to prevent racial discrimination from hindering minorityvoting rights through reapportionment plans. These state actions were
beyond the “political” arena and could be litigated.81
To rule that a plan is unconstitutional is difficult, as a violation only
75

Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137, 148 (M. Ga. 1977) (citing Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130, 142 (1975) (holding city plan violative of the Fifteenth Amendment))
(explaining that most cases dealing with racial redistricting plans are scrutinized under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
76
The Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (repealed 1894) (providing for
enforcement to protect the right to vote in federal elections); see also CONSTITUTION
ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 119.
77
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (holding laws relating to federal elections
are proper under the fifteenth amendment and the elections clause); see also United States
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (holing Congress went beyond the fifteenth amendment’s
scope in passing legislation relating to all elections).
78
Act of February 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36-37 (repealing all statutes relating to supervisors of elections).
79
CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 119 n.332; cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to
1973ee-6 (2000) (codifying all federal voting rights laws). See also Fannie Lou Hamer,
Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (renewing the Voting Rights Act in 2006
for another 25 years).
80
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
81
Id. at 347.
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occurs if the challenged scheme was designed to suppress minority voting
strength, and refusing to maximize minority voting strength is not required.82 Proportionality of electoral results is not guaranteed by the
Constitution even for protected classes such as racial minorities.83 Thus,
districting plans can be a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, but it is
difficult to prove a breach, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never found
one.
Because of the pattern of racial discrimination in American politics,
the Supreme Court has found an exception to the Election Clause’s default
mandate. Judicial action can be taken to ensure that districts have equal
population and race is not used as a factor in diluting voting strength. The
Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment permit court intervention, and the Congress has expanded those protections by enacting the
Voting Rights Act.84 Without these constitutional invitations, court action
would be foreclosed, and the Elections Clause directive that redistricting is
a congressional and state legislative political decision would be absolute.85
Slavery and racism required the exception to be established, but extreme
partisan politics is incomparable to these injustices.
V. IGNORING THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE’S DEFAULT WITHOUT A PROPER
EXCEPTION
Prior to 1986, the Court had always considered non-racial gerrymandering a nonjusticiable political question. It made this explicitly clear
in Colegrove v. Green, which was premised on the Elections Clause giving
Congress supreme authority over congressional districting.86 Recognizing
the Founders’ desire that Congress control congressional membership
procedures, the Court explained,
The short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in the popular House and left to
82

Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
49-51 (describing the elements needed to establish a prima facie case of racially motivated
vote dilution). Compare City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that a
discriminatory purpose must be proven to strike down a legislative districting plan) with 42
U.S.C.A. § 1973 (2003) (originally enacted as Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131) (requiring only a discriminatory effect must be shown).
83
Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1017-21.
84
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro.htm (last visited July 6, 2006); Jennifer
Yachnin, et al., Morning Business, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), July 20, 2006, at 3.
85
But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (making the U.S. of House of Representatives fall
within a stricter bound of the one-person, one-vote doctrine).
86
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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that House determination whether States have fulfilled their responsibility. If Congress failed in exercising its powers, whereby standards of fairness are offended, the
remedy ultimately lies with the people. Whether Congress faithfully discharges its
duty or not, the subject has been committed to the exclusive control of Congress.
An aspect of government from which the judiciary, in view of what is involved, has
been excluded by the clear intention of the Constitution cannot be entered by the
federal courts because Congress may have been in default in exacting from States
obedience to its mandate.87

In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court reversed its position and decided
that a purely partisan gerrymandering claim was justiciable, although it
claimed to have decided the issue previously in Gaffney v. Cummings.88 Its
decision, that political gerrymandering cases were justiciable, was premised
on a weak inference and a poor application of the Baker test. The decision
provided lackluster justifications for this judicial insertion into what was
previously a purely political question, and ignored the stare decisis of
Colegrove v. Green. Furthermore, it created the confusion that was uncorrected in The Texas Redistricting Cases.
Justice White’s first reason for deciding justiciability for these types
of cases is because he mentioned partisanship in an equal protection claim
in his opinion in Gaffney.89 That case did involve a politically motivated
gerrymander, but the justiciability issue was not directly addressed. The
claim was premised on a one-person, one-vote argument, and the case was
decided on that issue. Though equality of population was established to end
racially motivated districting, and it was logical to extend it to all situations,
it was incorrect to assume that this makes political gerrymandering justiciable. It begs the question to base the decision of Bandemer on this logic, and
doings so is equivalent to deciding a case without adjudicating an underlying issue, and then saying the issue is resolved because the case was
decided.
The other rationale used by Justice White for holding that political
gerrymandering cases are justiciable was a weak and results driven application of the Baker test. He parallels political gerrymandering to racial
gerrymandering, basing the former’s justiciability on the latter’s, without
recognizing any manifest differences between the two. 90 Explaining how
party identification, i.e. being a Democrat, Republican, or other party
member, is a protected class in a way similar to race is not mentioned in the
opinion. He recognizes that party identification is not immutable and has
87

Id. at 544.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
89
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (adjudicating a bipartisan, incumbent
protection gerrymander that had less than perfect population equality in districts).
90
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119. But see supra Part IV.B.5 (explaining the historical bias
against racial minorities and their classification as a protected class).
88
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not been subject to the same historical stigma that race has, but the similarities of the two to require justiciability are absent from the his discussion.91
It is true that Baker was an apportionment case, and that the oneperson, one-vote rule did not arise until a few years later, but the Court then
(and now) has been unable to formulate a “judicially discernible and
manageable standard” for partisan gerrymandering.92 The forecasts for such
a standard by Justice White have failed to come to fruition. Furthermore,
the requirement of fair representation as required by the one-person, onevote standard is not comparable to what is referred to as “adequacy of
representation.”93 It appears that Justice White believes that having a
voter’s chance of casting a winning vote as a member of a party is somehow
as constitutionally necessary as a individual’s vote being counted equally.
To the contrary, the Equal Protection Clause does not require proportional
representation, but this is the logical extension of having “the same chance
to elect representatives of [a political group’s] choice as any other political
group.”94
Bandemer failed to justify partisan gerrymandering’s justiciability
beyond Gaffney’s cursory involvement on the issue and a lax Baker test, but
after Bandemer the floodgates were opened to similar claims. During this
time, the “post-Bandemer/pre-Vieth era,” lower courts used Bandemer’s
opinion to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims, and all but once
ruling against judicial intervention.95 The 18 years of attempted application
of the standard produced only clarity in its error. As one scholar has
explained, “Bandemer has served almost exclusively as an invitation to
litigation without much prospect of redress.”96
In 2003, the Court revisited the issue of partisan gerrymandering’s
justiciability and ruled in a plurality opinion by Justice Scalia that these
case were political questions.97 The holding was premised predominantly
on a lack of a discernible standard to decide these questions. Justice Scalia
explained that the presence of an unconstitutional intent to use race in
91

Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119. See also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2003)
(citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 156 (O’Conner, J., concurring in the judgment)) (explaining
the shifting and weak nature of political identification as compared to race).
92
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
93
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124.
94
Id. at 150 (O’Conner, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[B]ut it is an altogether different matter to conclude that political groups themselves have an independent
constitutional claim to representation. And the Court’s decisions hold squarely that they do
not.” (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 78-79 (1980) (plurality opinion))).
95
See supra note 5.
96
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, 886 (Foundation Press rev. 2d ed.
2002).
97
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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redistricting schemes coupled with discriminatory effect against minorities
is judicially measurable.98 Not so with discriminatory intent and effect
against a person based on political party identification in the course of
legislative districting. Only four justices agreed that partisan gerrymandering was totally nonjusticiable in Vieth, so the issue was not entirely resolved
and left open the possibility of it being revisited once again.99 Indeed,
lawsuits would continue to be filed claiming discrimination by partisan
redistricting plans, leading up to the litigation revolving Texas’s middecade redistricting in 2003.
VI. THE TEXAS REDISTRICTING CASES
A. Facts
The circumstances of this case began with the reapportionment after
the 1990 census. Since Reconstruction, Texas was dominated by the
Democrat Party, but beginning in the late 1980s, the Republican Party
began making a significant resurgence.100 After the 1990 census, Texas was
awarded three additional seats in the U.S. House of Representatives while
the Democrat party controlled both houses of its state legislature and its
governorship.101 The redistricting plan that came out of the homogenic
structure was heavily favorable for congressional Democrats and was
described by nonpartisan political pundits as, “the shrewdest gerrymander
of the 1990s.”102 Lawsuits were filed against the plan, but the 1992 elections were held under the its districts resulting in 21 Democrats to 9
Republicans winning, but Democrats garnering only a 49.9% plurality of
the statewide vote.103 Throughout the 1990s, the Republican’s statewide
vote percentage continued to grow up to and beyond the 50% mark, but a
majority of the State’s representatives in Congress remained Democrats.104
By the time the 2000 census was completed, Texas’s population had
grown enough so that it was awarded two additional congressional seats.
The Texas legislature that would control this reapportionment was compiled
of a Republican majority in the state senate, but a Democrat majority in the

98

Id. at 293.
Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100
Brief of State Appellees at 1, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry
(The Texas Redistricting Cases), No. 05-2604 (2006).
101
MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2000,
at 1515 (National Journal 1999).
102
Id.
103
Brief of State, supra note 100, at 2.
104
BARONE & UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2000, at 1515.
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state house of representatives.105 The state legislature deadlocked in the
process, and a three-judge federal panel was needed to construct the map.
The court took a minimalist approach to not disturb the previous map and to
protect incumbents, and the result was essentially a perpetuation of the 1991
Democrat gerrymander.106 The 2002 election resulted in Republicans
receiving 53% of the statewide vote for congressional elections, but Democrats winning 17 of the 32 seats.107
Under much controversy, the 78th Texas Legislature – composed of
a Republican majority in both houses – passed a new congressional redistricting plan. It took two special sessions to be called by Governor Rick
Perry (R) – while Democrat legislators fled the state – in order to pass Plan
1374C.108 Hardly any one involved in the process hesitated to admit that
the plan was intended to create a map where Republicans would compose a
majority of Texas’s congressional delegation.109 The result was an election
in 2004 where Republicans won 21 of the 32 seats and obtained 58% of the
vote in statewide races.110 Before the 2004 election, but soon after Plan
1374C’s passage, appellants and other plaintiffs filed suit to have the map
of 2001 reinstated.111
B. Holding112
In a decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Court essentially held
that partisan gerrymandering claims are not a political question, and those
claims are justiciable. His reasoning was founded on Justice White’s
reasoning in Bandemer, which in turn was founded on White’s assumptions
in Gaffney. In regards to justiciability, Kennedy was explicitly joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and joined as to the disposition of the case by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. The latter two
claimed that neither the appellants nor appellees had raised the issue;
therefore they took no position on it. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Breyer, wrote that the issue was justiciable, but did so in a separate opinion
105

MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS
2006, at 1575 (National Journal 2006).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Brief of State, supra note 100, at 8-9.
109
Indeed, then-Majority Leader Tom DeLay, who was widely credited with orchestrating the 2003 redistricting, was quoted as saying, “I’m the majority leader, and I want
more seats.” Lee Hockstader, A Texas-Sized Brawl Over Redistricting, WASH. POST, May
17, 2003, at A3.
110
BARONE & COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2006, at 1576.
111
Brief of State, supra note 100, at 12.
112
The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
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with his own reasoning. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented
to all aspects of the case, including the justiciability issue.
Once a majority of the Court found that partisan gerrymandering
was justiciable, the confusion continued, but the result was a holding that
the 2003 Texas redistricting plan was not a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Alito, and Chief Justice
Roberts agreed on this decision, while Justices Scalia and Thomas did not
address it (since they argued the issue was nonjusticiable). Justices Stevens
and Breyer dissented to this and argued that the plan was partially, if not
entirely, a violation of the equal protection rights of Texas Democrats. The
multiple opinions then went on to address alleged violations of the Voting
Rights Act by the plan with a majority holding that the 23rd District was
illegal. The result is Texas being partially redistricted to cure this Voting
Rights Act violation.113
C. Critical Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning
1. A Disingenuous Approach to the Underlying Issue
Justice Kennedy in writing his plurality opinion in The Texas Redistricting Cases assumes justiciability of the issue of political gerrymandering
cases. He fails to state exactly why these types of cases are justiciable, and
no Baker test is done to determine if any of its six elements are present.114
The opinion does investigate whether a reliable standard for adjudicating
equal protection claims is offered by appellants, and concludes that one is
not. The fact that the Texas plan in question was enacted mid-decade does
not offend the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against discrimination
or its one-person, one-vote requirement.115
Although this is a correct conclusion, it is an incorrect method, and
only extends the assumptions of Gaffney and Bandemer. Before concluding
that the appellants “state no claim on which relief may be granted,” the
Court should have first determined if this issue is justiciable and if the
Constitution gives it authority to interject itself into such political issues.116
Furthermore, the Court makes no distinction as to state legislative
districting plans and congressional districting plans.117 Although most are
113

Since the Voting Rights Act is a congressional invitation for judicial supervision of
redistricting plans, and the Fifteenth Amendment permits judicial review in racial gerrymandering cases, this note concedes in arguendo that this aspect of the case was correctly
decided.
114
The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. at 2607.
115
Id. at 2609-12.
116
Id. at 2612.
117
This Note claims both are nonjusticiable political questions, but acknowledges a
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developed at the same time, the Constitution dictates directly to the latter in
terms of giving state legislatures and Congress sole authority in regulating
congressional elections. Bandemer, which first established justiciability of
political gerrymandering cases, was a challenge to a state legislative plan
and not a congressional plan.118 Vieth’s plurality addressed a congressional
districting plan, but held the entire scope of partisan gerrymandering claims
as nonjusticiable.119 Therefore, when the Court adjudicated the equal
protection claims in the Texas Redistricting Cases, it was its first decision
directly inserting itself into Congress’s authority to self-regulate partisan
gerrymandering, and the Court did so without recognizing the momentous
step it was taking. The Elections Clause and Colegrove v. Green, which
held congressional districting challenges as nonjusticiable, were ignored.
2. An Inability to Formulate a Measurable Standard of Unfairness
One of the Baker elements that must be present to establish justiciability is for the presence of a judicially manageable and discernible standard
of adjudication.120 Since Bandemer, and in The Texas Redistricting Cases,
the Court has been unable to articulate a standard or find agreement
amongst the justices to any of the many proposed standards. This inability
to agree or discern a standard demonstrates partisan gerrymandering’s
nonjusticiability.
In Bandemer, the Court first attempted to articulate a standard for
adjudicating such claims that was modeled off the racial gerrymandering
standard.121 This was an intent and effects test, but its difficulty in application was a result of the dissimilarities between race and party identification.
Fourteen years later, when the Court nearly reversed itself in Vieth, its
dissents were still unable to articulate a single, discernible standard to
adjudicate these claims.122 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer each
formulated standards, but all failed in determining when politics in districting is actually too much politics. In The Texas Redistricting Cases, the
Court’s opinion states that a presumption to invalidate mid-decade redistricting is improper, and after examining two other proffered standards,
rebukes each of them as unworkable or overly constraining.123 The result is
distinction between the two based on the Elections Clause, which makes claims against
congressional districting plans more nonjusticiable.
118
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
119
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
120
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
121
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127-43.
122
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317-68.
123
The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2609-11 (2006) (holding that both
a “sole-intent” standard and a “symmetry” standard are unreliable).
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more standards discussed, but a consistent inability for agreement on how to
resolve such claims as required by Baker v. Carr.
The one-person, one-vote rule as articulated in Gray v. Sanders was
announced soon after Baker and is characterized by its ease of application.124 The Court has had 20 years since Bandemer to articulate a standard
for partisan gerrymandering claims, and after contemplating at least five,
none have been found effective. In addition, racial gerrymandering is a
simple matter to adjudicate, especially because of race’s status as a suspect
class. Political identification is not such a class, but rather a fluid concept
amongst voters, which has proven immeasurable in regards to unconstitutional discrimination. Furthermore, Congress has provided base standards
to measure illegal racial gerrymandering in the Voting Rights Act,125 but
not so with partisan gerrymandering.
3. A Rejection of the Elections Clause’s Default Position
Within The Texas Redistricting Cases there is little mention of the
Elections Clause or its jurisprudence and history in American law. Because
the Court in essence ignores this provision and its importance in congressional redistricting, it takes no deference to congressional acts or the
decisions of state legislatures. Justice Kennedy mentions the clause in his
preliminary discussion of the relation of the branches of government in
regards to apportionment, but does not recognize that the Constitution has
provided exceptions to the Elections Clause to allow courts to regulate only
racial gerrymandering.126 Doing so, he rejects the remaining default
position of the Elections Clause and ignores the “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment” of this issue to Congress.127
The opinion’s rejection of the default position of the Elections
Clause also fails to realize that judicial intervention is unneeded for a
variety of reasons. First, politics is circular as paradigms shift, and the
democratic process is able to correct any extreme partisan gerrymandering
plans over time.128 Second, for partisan gerrymandering to be effective, it
must make elections in districts closer by the packing and cracking process.
The more these procedures occur, the closer elections become, and the more
likely the gerrymandering plan will fail. This makes political gerrymandering a self-limiting procedure.129 Also, if citizens are disgruntled by extreme
124

372 U.S. 368 (1963).
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
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The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. at 2608.
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See supra Part I.A.
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gerrymandering practices of legislators (or the beneficiaries of these plans,
i.e. U.S. Representatives) an anti-incumbency mood can influence the
electorate, and these politicians will be defeated in the next elections. In
American democracy, voters tend to vote for individuals and not party
representation; therefore in most regions incumbents are never perfectly
safe simply because of their party identification, and in other regions one
party is highly predominant at all levels of government because of the
behavior and choice of that electorate.130 Furthermore, governors in most
states possess veto power of redistricting legislation,131 so if the controlling
party in the legislature that is attempting to gerrymander in its favor is
actually the state’s minority party, then the governor will likely be in the
majority party and can veto an extreme plan. All of these reasons demonstrate that it is systematic of a democracy to correct extreme partisan
gerrymandering, and judicial action is unnecessary.132
By ignoring the default position of the Elections Clause, the Court
demonstrates a lack of faith in the democratic process and interjects the
least democratic branch of government into what is truly a political question. This is in essence “expressing lack of the respect due” to Congress as
the ultimate authority under the Constitution to regulate the elections in
which its members are chosen.133
VII. CONCLUSION
While the holding of The Texas Redistricting Cases was correct, the
opinion produced no clear guidance for future cases. The Court should
have held that political gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable political
questions.
A. The Effects on State Legislatures and Possible Solutions
Because of the decision in The Texas Redistricting Cases, state legislatures face two seemingly contradictory effects. First, since the Court
judgment) (explaining the electoral risks involved in political gerrymandering and the
potential for “disaster” in an “overambitious” plan).
130
JERROLD G. RUSK, A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 510515 (CQ Press 2001). See generally id. at tbl.8.6 (demonstrating the evolving patterns of
party identification in some regions over time and entrenched party identification in other
regions).
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ix (1999).
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implicitly ruled that such cases are justiciable, it is likely that nearly all of
their districting plans – whether decennially or mid-decade – will be challenged in courts. The Voting Rights Act causes litigation as well, but it is
congressionally mandated supervision and courts have a clearer standard for
resolving such issues.134 No clear standard can be formulated by the Court
to resolve partisan motivated gerrymandering, but this inability will not
prevent lawsuits. Second, the Court’s inability to articulate a standard will
cause lower courts difficulty in adjudicating such claim. But, because
egregious partisan gerrymandering was held constitutional in Bandemer,
Vieth, and The Texas Redistricting Cases, lower courts will likely dismiss
future lawsuits. This likelihood will not prevent suits from being filed as a
proper holding in The Texas Redistricting Cases would have accomplished.
To aid state legislatures in preventing judicial scrutiny of their districting plans, they should utilize one or more of the variety of options at
their disposal. The most drastic choice is all encompassing and would cure
the process of any partisanship; that is to remove the process from the
legislature. A variety of states have established commissions to handle the
entire process that are composed of members of both parties and usually
independents.135 These commissions act similarly to the three-judge panels
used in federal court, but state legislatures, or citizens through ballot
initiatives, have approved the process, creating self-denial of partisanship.
Redistricting commissions are likely a popular method of foreclosing
judicial activity, and it is an example of democracy’s recursiveness limiting
an alleged flaw.
A less drastic, but also a less certain way to prevent adjudication of
political gerrymandering cases is for state legislatures to impose requirements of the districts they create.136 Challenges could still be brought under
the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments in federal court, but requirements such as contiguity and compactness would lessen partisan effects of
districting plans. Predetermined and specific criteria for districts would
make adjudicating cases simpler and easier to dismiss. Self-imposing
districting criteria would provide a more democratic resolution to the
supposed problem, as compared to unrestrained judicial intervention.
B. Ways for Congress to Foreclose Judicial Action on Gerrymandering
Cases
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Like state legislatures, Congress can take actions that will
prevent courts from adjudicating political gerrymandering claims. It could
take actions similar to those described supra by legislatures to reduce the
amount of partisanship in the process. The Elections Clause makes Congress supreme on such matters, so mandating plans be drafted and approved
by a commission is certainly an available option, which would have the
same effect and benefits as if state legislatures had done so themselves. 137
Creating standards, unless done precisely and finitely, would
not reduce federal court intervention or litigation. A vague standard such as
“compact and contiguous” is not sufficiently finite, and such definitions
would have to be determined through judicial interpretation. To reduce this
effect, a definite permissible “gerrymandering quotient” should be established, thus making judicial enforcement simple and efficient.138
A more succinct way for Congress to preclude court action
on partisan gerrymandering claims is to attempt to remove federal court
jurisdiction. If allowed, a law preventing lower courts from hearing claims
based on a constitutional challenge to partisan gerrymandering districts
would also decide the issue of justiciability by democratic means. Congress
would be acting under its constitutional authority to “ordain and establish”
lower courts and make exceptions and regulations to Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction.139 It is possible that the Supreme Court would rule
such a law to restrict jurisdiction of political gerrymandering cases is also
unconstitutional, but Congress should nevertheless attempt such an action.140
C. A Way for Lower Courts to Dismiss Gerrymandering Cases
Without a clear standard for determining the constitutionality of districting plans that contain partisan intent and effects, lower courts are placed
in the same scenario as they were during the “post-Bandemer/pre-Vieth
era.”141 Therefore, lower courts should dismiss all cases brought on this
137
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issue as a result of The Texas Redistricting Cases’ inability to formulate a
clear standard. By simply explaining that no standard has been articulated
and that no partisan redistricting plan has ever been held unconstitutional,
lower courts should refuse to adjudicate any further political gerrymandering claims. 142 It would be inefficient and incorrect to do otherwise.
The only benefit to The Texas Redistricting Cases’ holding is its
demonstration that egregiousness partisanship in gerrymandering is likely
constitutional. After the redistricting plans in Texas and Pennsylvania, it is
hard to imagine an instance of political gerrymandering that can surpass the
intent and effects of these schemes, especially since even racial gerrymandering plans have rarely been struck on purely constitutional grounds.143
Regardless, the Supreme Court wasted a valuable opportunity to resolve this
important issue and remove itself from an ever-present practice of American
politics. Instead it has left the question unanswered and left open the
possibility for judges to shape congressional membership, allowing the
judiciary to supplant the text and intent of the Elections Clause.144
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